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In Search of Approaches to Improving Corporate
Governance in China's State-Owned Commercial
Banks
ZHONGFEI ZHOU* AND JINGWEI LI**

I. Introduction
From a banking industry perspective, a corporate governance system can be defined as a
set of mechanisms in setting the incentives for a banking organization to act prudently and
for control of the risks that a bank takes. Good corporate governance has been regarded as
one of the paramount factors in maintaining financial stability in a country.' This significant
consensus was reached after a series of well-known bank failures: the collapse of the Bank
of Credit and Commerce International,2 the debacle of the Barings Bank,3 and the scandal
in the Daiwa's New York branch.4 In addition, even more significant financial crises in Asia,
Russian, and other transition countries added a new urgency to the establishment of legal,
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of Finance and Economics, People's Republic of China.

**LL.B (Beijing), LL.M (Beijing), Lecturer of the Research Institute of International Trade, University of
International Business and Economics, Beijing.
1. See JOSEPH J. NORTON, FINANCIAL SEcToR LAw REFORM IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 37-38 (2000). Other
factors include a robust financial system, a strengthening and expansion of domestic capital markets and the
need for an effective insolvency regime combined with the creation of a suitable social safety net. See id.The
IMF also holds a similar viewpoint. See IMF, INTERNATIONAL CAPrrAL MARKETS: DEVELOPMENTS, PaosPEcrs
AND KEY PoLICY ISSUES (Charles Adams et al. eds., 1999).

2. For a general discussion of the BCCI collapse, see generally Richard Dale, BankingRegulation afterBCCI,
8(1) J. INT'L BANKING L. 8 (1993); HousE oF COMMONS, BANKING SUPERVISION AND BCCI: INTERNATIONAL AND

NATIONAL REGULATION (1992); Maximilian J. B. Hall, The BCCI Affair, BANING WORsLD, Sept. 1991; Hal S.
Scott, Supervision ofinternationalBanking Post-BCC, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 487 (1992).
3. For a more detailed analysis of the role played by bad corporate governance in the failure of Barings
Bank, see Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, Globalizationof FinancialRisks and InternationalSupervision
of Banks and Securities Firms: Lessonsfrom the Barings Debacle, 30 INT'L LAw. 301 (1996).
4. For a discussion of the Daiwai scandal, see, e.g., Sarah Marks, RegulatorsJusify Reactions to Baringsand
Daiwa, INT'L FIN. L. REv. (1996); Brian P. Volkman, The Global Convergence ofBank Regulation and Standards
for Compliance, 115 BANKING L.J. 550 (1998).
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regulatory, and internal systems for corporate governance in banking organizations.5 Thus,
corporate governance has become a topic of global concern.
Numerous public and private bodies, at national, regional, and international levels have
realized the importance of corporate governance and established standards and norms related to important aspects of corporate governance.6 In particular, on a general company
level, the Organization for Economic and Cooperation Development (hereinafter OECD)
issued Principles of Corporate Governance in June 1999.1 As to banking institutions, the
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision published Enhancing Corporate Governance for
Banking Organizations in September 1999.8

5. See generally SAY Goo ET AL., INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM: STANDARD SETTING AND INFRAsTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT, Part III (forthcoming 2002). For a general discussion of recent financial crises,
see DOUGLAS ARNEa ET AL., INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL.CRISIS OF THE 1990s (forthcoming 2002).

6. For example, in the United States, there are the General Motors Board Guidelines on Significant Corporate Governance Issues 1995, Statement of Governance Principles; in the United Kingdom, there are the
1992 Cadbury Report, the 1995 Greenbury Report, and the 1998 Hampel Report. In Canada, the Toronto
Stock Exchange drafted the Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in 1994, while France had the
Vienot Report on "the Board of Directors of Listed Companies in France" in 1995. In the EU context, there
are the First Directive (68/151/EEC), Draft Fifth Directive, Draft Ninth Directive, the Twelfth Directive, and
the Proposal for a Thirteenth Directive dealing with the matters of approximation of corporate governance.
On a discussion of harmonization of national corporate governance laws in the EU, see generallyJohn H. Farrar,
The New FinancialArchitectureand Effective Corporate Governance, 33 INT'L LAw. 927, 937-43 (1999). The U.S.
Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) had been working with the International Accounting Standards
(IASC) for nearly a decade to promulgate a core set of accounting pronouncements. The finance ministers and
central bank governors of the G7 countries have also announced their support for the IASC and have encouraged it to complete its proposed set of core principles. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and
Prescriptionsin the Vertical Dimension of GlobalCorporateGovernance, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1133, 1154-57 (1999).

7.

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,

ERNANCE
(1999)

8.

OECD

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE Gov-

[hereinafter OECD Principles].

BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR BANKING OR-

GANIsATIONS (1999) [hereinafter BIS BANKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].

9. The Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Chinese Communist Party Congress endorsed the creation of a
modern enterprise system. See Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Decision ofte CPCCentral
Committee on Some ites Concerning the Ertablishment of a SocialistMarket Economic Structure, PEOPLE'S DAILY,

Nov. 17, 1993, at 1-2, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn. In December 1993, the Fifth Plenum of
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted the Company Law, in which a limited
liability company or a joint stock limited company is required to implement internal management mechanisms
characterized by clear definition of rights and responsibilities, scientific management, and a combination of
encouragement and restraint. See Company Law of the People's Republic of China (Dec. 29, 1993,
art. 6 [hereinafter 1993 Company Law], available at http://www.cietac-sz.org.cn/cietac/English/Convention/
Com0l.htm. Due to weak monitoring mechanisms in wholly state-owned companies, in December 1999 the
National People's Congress amended the 1993 Company Law by replacing the provision on state-authorized
institution (article 67) with the provision on supervisory board in wholly state-owned companies (Article 67 of
the 1993 Company Law reads: a state-authorized investnent institution or a departnent authorized by the

state shall exercise supervision and management of the state-owned assets in wholly state-owned companies in
accordance with laws and administrative regulations. 1993 Company Law, art. 67. Article 67 of the 1999
Company Law reads: the supervisory board in a wholly state-owned company consists of members mainly from
the State Council or institutions and deparments authorized by the State Council with the participation of the
employee representatives of the company. The number of the supervisory board members shall not be less
than three. The supervisory board shall perform functions in accordance with the articles (1) and (2) of this
Law and other functions stipulated by the State Council. 1999 Company Law, art. 67 (P.R.C.). In March 2000,
the State Council promulgated the Interim Regulations on Supervisory Board in State-Owned Enterprises,
which clearly provides that the supervisory board, delegated by the State Council, is responsible to the State
Council for supervising the matters relating to preserving and increasing the value of state-owned assets on
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The Chinese government has paid a great deal of attention to the issue of corporate governance in companies. 9 In the banking industry the Central Bank, the People's Bank of China
(hereinafter PBOC), promulgated the Interim Regulations on the Supervisory Board in
Wholly State-Owned Commercial Banks in November 1997. In March 2000, the State Council issued the Interim Regulations on the Supervisory Board in Major State-Owned Financial
Institutions, which replaced the PBOC's 1997 Interim Regulations. Moreover, in both the
1993 Company Law and 1999 Company Law the relevant provisions with respect to corporate
governance also apply to state-owned commercial banks as limited liability companies.
Despite these efforts, however, the situation of corporate governance in China's stateowned banks has not been satisfactory. Low efficiency, political intervention, nonperforming loans, corruption, and the like have been frequently described as characteristics
of the four biggest wholly state-owned commercial banks (i.e., the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Bank of China, the Construction Bank of China, and the Agricultural Bank of China). For this reason, a number of calls for privatization of the four
banks have emerged. It seems that privatization is a panacea for improving corporate governance in China's wholly state-owned commercial banks.
This article is intended to discuss whether privatization is an appropriate approach to
improving corporate governance of wholly state-owned commercial banks in China's special context. Section II summarizes the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and
the BIS Banking Corporate Governance, and makes a brief comment on these two guidelines. This section also discusses China's 1999 Company Law and the State Council's Interim Regulations on the Supervisory Board in Major State-Owned Financial Institutions,
and points out weaknesses in terms of law, institutions, and property rights which have
posed impediments to the formulation of sound corporate governance in China's stateowned banks. Most of the significant problems with corporate governance can be attributed
to the lack of effective monitoring. Section III reaches a conclusion that privatization is not
a workable way to improve corporate governance in China's state-owned banks under its
present circumstances. In this part we suggest that setting up a special bank investment
company may provide an effective monitoring mechanism. In section IV, we conclude that
the problems corporate governance reforms are facing are not only to who state-owned
banks are accountable, but also for what they are accountable.
1l. General Frameworks for Corporate Governance
For this article's purpose, we will summarize and comment on the OECD Principles of
Corporate Governance and the BIS Banking Corporate Governance. To have an entire
understanding of corporate governance in banks, the BIS Banking Corporate Governance
must be considered in conjunction with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.
Against this general background the frameworks for corporate governance in China's stateowned banks will be dealt with and their weaknesses will also be discussed in this section.
behalf of the state. See State Council, Interim Regulations on Supervisory Board in State-Owned Enterprises,
art. 1 (P.R.C.). The initiative of enhancing corporate governance in state-owned companies is paralleled by
the Basic Norms for the Establishment of Modem Enterprise System and Enhancement of Management in
Large- and Medium-Sized State-Owned Enterprises issued by the State Commission for Economy and Trade
in October 2000. This Basic Norms emphasize once more the separation of the government and the enterprise
and the setting up of corporate governance structures. See State Commission for Economy and Trade, Basic
Norms for the Establishment of Modem Enterprise System and Enhancement of Management in Large- and
Medium-Sized State-Owned Enterprises, para. 1 (P.R.C.).

SPRING 2002

218

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

A. OECD

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND

BIS BANKING

CORPORATE

GoERNANCE AS A REFERENCE

1. OECD Principlesof Corporate Governance
The OECD has a long experience in the area of corporate governance. Work on various
aspects of corporate governance has been carried out by specialized OECD groups working
on topics such as accounting, financial markets, and private sector development. In 1999,
the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were published and intended to assist
member and non-member governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal,
institutional, and regulatory framework for corporate governance in their countries, and to
provide guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, investors, corporations, and other
parties that have a role in the process of developing good corporate governance.' 0
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance focus on the relationships between a
company's management, its board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders, by setting incentives for the board and management to act in the interests of the company and shareholders, and to facilitate effective monitoring. The OECD suggests that this purpose can
be achieved through the protection of shareholders' rights" and equitable treatment of
shareholders.,2 Also, the OECD recognizes that the competitiveness and ultimate success
of a corporation is the result of co-efforts from various participants including investors,
employees, creditors, and suppliers. Accordingly, the corporate governance framework
should respect the role of stakeholders in corporate governance. 3
Market discipline of companies depends largely on information disclosure, which is a
basic pre-condition for shareholders to obtain the ability to exercise their voting rights.
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance strongly advocate timely and accurate
4
disclosure of all material information.'
Although sound corporate governance depends on the co-efforts of stakeholders, the
board still plays a major role. On the one hand, the board should exercise effective monitoring of management; on the other hand, the board is accountable to the company and
the shareholders. The corporate governance framework should establish the responsibilities
of the board.' 5
10. OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 2.
11. "Basic shareholder rights include the right to: (1)
secure methods of ownership registration; (2)convey
or transfer shares; (3) obtain relevant information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis; (4) participate and vote in general shareholder meetings; (5) elect members of the board; and (6) share in the profits
of the corporation." Id. at 5.
12. The equitable treatment of shareholders can be achieved through the following means: (1) all shareholders of the same class should be treated equally, (2) insider trading and abusive self-dealing should be
prohibited; and (3) members of the board and managers should be required to disclose any material interests
in transactions or matters affecting the corporation. Id. at 6.
13. The role of stakeholders in corporate governance can be facilitated where (1)
the corporate governance
framework respects the rights of stakeholders that are protected by law; (2)stakeholders have the opportunity
to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights; (3) the corporate governance framework permits
performance-enhancing mechanisms for stakeholder participation; and (4) stakeholders are able to have access
to relevant information when they participate in the corporate governance process. Id. at 7.
14. This information includes the financial and operating results of the company, company objectives; major
share ownership and voting rights; members of the board and key executives, and their remuneration; material
foreseeable risk factors; material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders; governance structures and
policies. Id. at 8.
15. Seeid.
at 23-25 (regarding the responsibilities of the board).
VOL. 36, NO. 1
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2. BIS Banking CorporateGovernance
As part of its ongoing efforts to establish sound corporate governance guidelines,6 the
Basle Committee, in September 1999, published Enhancing Corporate Governance for
Banking Organizations. The BIS Banking Corporate Governance focuses on the manner
in which the business and affairs of individual banking institutions are governed by their
boards of directors and senior management." Based on supervisory experience with corporate governance problems at banking institutions, the Basle Committee suggests that
sound corporate governance practices include (1) establishing strategic objectives and a set
of corporate values that are communicated throughout the banking organization; (2) setting
and enforcing clear lines of responsibility and accountability throughout the organization;
(3) ensuring that board members are qualified for their positions, have a clear understanding
of their role in corporate governance, and are not subject to undue influence from management or outside concerns; (4) ensuring that there is appropriate oversight by senior
management; (5) effectively utilizing the work conducted by internal and external auditors;
(6) ensuring that compensation approaches are consistent with the bank's ethical values,
objectives, strategy and control environment; and (7) conducting corporate governance in
a transparent manner. 8
3. Brief Comments
Corporate governance patterns can be classified into outsider models and insider models
according to the degree of ownership and control. An outsider model, notably in the United
States and United Kingdom, is characterized by widely dispersed ownership. An insider
model, notably in Germany and Japan, is characterized by concentrated ownership. The
basic conflict of interest in the outsider model is between strong managers and widely
dispersed weak shareholders. By contrast, the conflict in the insider model is between controlling shareholders and weak minority shareholders. The OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance try to reduce these conflicts. They intend to balance the interests between the
board and shareholders by protecting shareholders' rights and delineating the responsibilities of the board on the one hand. On the other hand, they provide equitable protection
to all shareholders, whether controlling shareholders or minority shareholders.
In terms of accountability of the board and management, corporate governance models
can be divided into shareholder primacy and stakeholder primacy. Shareholder primacy
emphasizes the accountability of the board and management to shareholders-that they
should act in the interests of shareholders. Stakeholder primacy holds the board and management accountable to relations involving the corporation. The scope of the relations,
however, varies. The scope may extend to social constituents such as members of the community in which the corporation is located, environmental interests, local and national

16. Over the past few years, the Basle Committee has issued several documents relating to corporate governance in banks. These documents include Principles for the Management of Interest Rate Risk (Sept. 1997),
Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organizations (Sept. 1997), Enhancing Bank Transparency (Sept. 1998), and Principles for the Management of Credit Risk (consultative document, July 1999). BIS
BmwNG CoapoRaTE GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 3.

17. See id.
18. Id. at 5-9.
SPRING 2002
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governments, and society at large.19 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance may
take a compromising approach. They do not clearly define the scope of the relations involving the corporation. They ambiguously limit the scope to investors, employees, creditors, and suppliers. 0 However, the BIS Banking Corporate Governance includes the community, even supervisors and governments, in the scope of stakeholders. 2
The more numerous the parties to which the board and management are deemed to be
accountable, the broader the scope of accountability and the wider the range of corporate
objectives. So the corporate governance framework should consider the scope of the stakeholder when setting objectives. Unfortunately, however, both the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the BIS Banking Corporate Governance separate the two aspects.
The BIS Banking Corporate Governance focuses on sound practices of the banks inside
management. It does not deal with the relations between the board and management and
shareholders/stakeholders. As it points out, therefore, the BIS Banking Corporate Governance must not be isolated from laws, disclosure and listing requirements, audit standards,
and bank industry principles and sound practices to have an entire understanding of bank
corporate governance.22
It is widely recognized that markets contain disciplinary mechanisms that can effectively
monitor the performance of a firm. Therefore, a strong information disclosure regime is a
pivotal feature of sound corporate governance. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the BIS Banking Corporate Governance together with the Basle Committee's
Enhancing Bank Transparency re-emphasize the importance of public disclosure. They
explicitly and implicitly require that information be disclosed according to the principles
of comprehensiveness, relevance, timeliness, reliability, comparability, and materiality.
Moreover, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance address the issue of disclosure
of negative information. Under these principles, companies are not expected to disclose
information that may endanger their competitive position unless disclosure is necessary to
fully inform the investment decision and to avoid misleading the investor.2" In our opinion,
however, public disclosure can serve as a deterrent to companies. It is the damaging effects
of disclosing negative information that put ex ante pressure on companies to run their
business prudently and give companies incentives to control themselves in a proper manner.
For this reason, we argue that full disclosure of information, whether bad or good, is essential to strengthen market discipline. However, full disclosure should be respectful to
privacy laws and regulations.
B. LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
OF WHOLLY STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS IN CHINA

Over the past seven years, the Chinese government has realized the importance of corporate governance in wholly state-owned commercial banks. The corporate governance
framework for banks has been established. The 1993 Company Law established a basic
19. MARIA MAHER & THOMAS ANDERSON, CORPORATE GOVERANCE: EFFECTS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE AND
EcoNOMIC GROWTH, at 8 (1999). However, the stakeholder model has more narrowly defined stakeholders to

be those actors who have contributed firm-specific assets. Id. at 9.
20. SeeOECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 15.
21. BIS BANKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 3 n.3.

22. See id. at 10.
23. OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 17.
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structure of corporate governance in a general company, which is critically relevant to
wholly state-owned commercial banks. Afterwards, the Commercial Banking Law was
adopted in 1995. There are two more important laws worthy to be illustrated. One is the
1999 Company Law where the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
added a new provision on the supervisory board of wholly state-owned companies. The
other is the Interim Regulations on Supervisory Board in Major State-Owned Financial
Institutions issued by the State Council in 2000. In addition, the PBOC issued the Guiding
Principles for Strengthening Internal Controls of Financial Institutions in China in May
1997 and the Guidance for Regulation of Commercial Banks in 2001, respectively.
1. The 1999 Company Law
Wholly state-owned commercial banks belong to the category of wholly state-owned
companies in the company law. The difference between them is that the four biggest stateowned commercial banks are subordinated directly to the State Council rather than to the
state-authorized investment institution or the department authorized by the State. The
1999 Company Law as well as the 1993 Company Law sets up a special section for wholly
state-owned companies.24 A wholly state-owned company is defined as a limited liability
company invested in and established solely by a state-authorized investment institution or
a department authorized by the State.2"
Wholly state-owned companies do not need to set up a shareholder meeting. Instead,
the board of directors shall be authorized by the state-authorized investment institution or
by the department authorized by the State to exercise part of the functions and powers of
the shareholder meeting 6 and to make decisions on important matters of the company.
However, the merger, division, dissolution, increase and reduction of capital, and issuance
of company bonds must be decided by the state-authorized investment institution or by the
department authorized by the State."
24. On the difference in the section between 1993 Company Law and 1999 Company Law, seeCompany
Law, supra note 9.
25. 1999 Company Law, art. 64. A limited liability company refers to as such a company where shareholders
assume liability towards the company to the extent of their respective capital contributions, and the company
is liable for its debts to the extent of all its assets. Id. art. 3.
26. Id. art. 38, the shareholder meeting of a limited liability company performs the following functions and

powers:
To decide on the business policy and investment plan of the company;
* To elect and recall members of the board of directors and to decide on matters concerning the
remuneration of directors;
* To elect and recall supervisors appointed from among the shareholders' representatives, and to decide
on matters concerning the remuneration of supervisors;
To examine and approve reports of the board of directors;
* To examine and approve reports of the supervisory board or supervisors;
To examine and approve the annual financial budget plan and final accounts plan of the company;
* To examine and approve plans for profit distribution of the company and plans for making up losses;
* To adopt resolutions on the increase or reduction of the registered capital of the company;
To adopt resolutions on the issuance of company bonds;
* To adopt resolutions on the assignment of capital contribution by a shareholder to a person other
than the shareholders;
* To adopt resolutions on matters such as the merger, division, transformation, dissolution and liquidation of the company;
* To amend the articles of association of the company.
27. Id. art. 66.
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A wholly state-owned company shall have the board of directors, each term of office of
which shall be three years, which shall exercise its functions and powers in accordance with
the provisions of Article 46 and Article 66 of the 1999 Company Law.2" The board of
directors shall be composed of three to nine members, who shall be appointed and replaced
by the state-authorized investment institution or by the department authorized by the State
in accordance with the term of office of the board of directors. 9 The chairman and vicechairman of the board of directors shall be designated by the state-authorized investment
institution or by the department authorized by the State from among members of the board
of directors) 5 The participation of the employee representatives, who are democratically
elected by the employees, in the board of directors is legally mandatory according to this
Company Law."
The manager of a wholly state-owned company is appointed and dismissed by the board
of directors; a member of the board of directors may, subject to the approval of the stateauthorized investment institution or the department authorized by the State, serve concurrently as manager.32 The manager shall exercise his functions and powers in accordance
with the provisions of Article 50 of the 1999 Company Law."
To avoid conflicts of interest, the 1999 Company Law stipulates that the chairman, vicechairman, and directors of the board, or the manager of a wholly state-owned company
may not, without the approval of the state-authorized investment institution or the department authorized by the State, serve concurrently as responsible persons in other limited
34
liability companies, joint stock limited companies, or other business organizations.

28. Id. art. 68. Article 46 of the 1999 Company Law reads as follows: the board of directors shall be re-

sponsible to the shareholders' meeting, and exercise the following functions and powers: (1)to be responsible
for convening shareholders' meetings and to report on its work to the shareholders' meetings; (2) to implement

the resolutions of the shareholders' meetings; (3)to decide on the business plans and investment plans of the
company, (4) to formulate the annual financial budget plan and final accounts plan of the company, (5) to
formulate plans for profit distribution and plans for making up losses of the company, (6) to formulate plans
for the increase or reduction of the registered capital of the company; (7) to formulate plans for the merger,
division, transformation and dissolution of the company, (8) to decide on the establishment of the company's
internal management organs; (9) to appoint or dismiss the company's general manager (hereinafter manager),
and, upon recommendation of the manager, to appoint and dismiss the company's deputy manager(s) and

persons in charge of the financial affairs of the company, and to decide on matters concerning their remuneration; and (10) to formulate the company's basic management structure. 1999 Company Law, art. 66, see supra

text accompanying note 27.
29. Id. art. 68.
30. Id.
31. See 1999 Company Law, art. 68.
32. Id. art. 69.
33. Id. art. 50. A limited liability company shall have a manager, who shall be appointed or dismissed by the
board of directors. The manager shall be responsible to the board of directors and shall exercise the following
functions and powers: (1)to be in charge of the production, operation and management of the company, and
to organize the implementation of the resolutions of the board of directors; (2)to organize the implementation
of the annual business plans and investment plans of the company, (3)to draw up plans on the establishment
of the internal management organs of the company, (4) to draw up the basic management system of the
company- (5)to formulate specific rules and regulations of the company, (6)to recommend the appointment
or dismissal of the deputy manager(s) and of persons incharge of the financial affairs of the company; (7)to
appoint or dismiss management personnel other than those to be appointed or dismissed by the board of
directors; and (8)other functions and powers granted by the articles of association of the company and the
board of directors.
34. Id. art. 70.
VOL. 36, NO. 1
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State-owned asset stripping, i.e., the illegal transformation of state assets to non-state
ownership, is one of the causes for deteriorating financial performance of state-owned
firms." For the purpose of safeguarding state-owned assets in wholly state-owned companies, the 1999 Company Law requires that where a wholly state-owned company transfers
its assets, the procedures for examination and approval and the transfer of property rights
shall be handled by the state-authorized investment institution or the department authorized by the State in accordance with the laws and administrative rules and regulations.16
One objective of the 1999 and 1993 Company Law is to separate government and business functions, which is also reflected in the provisions on wholly state-owned companies.
The 1999 Company Law allows large-sized wholly state-owned companies with a sound
business management system and relatively successful operation, authorized by the State
Council, to exercise the rights of state asset owners. 37
2. Interim Regulationson Supervisory Board in MajorState-Owned FinancialInstitutions
The 1999 Company Law adds a new article in the section of wholly state-owned companies, which requires a wholly state-owned company to establish the supervisory board,3"
while the 1993 Company Law does not make reference to the supervisory board in wholly
state-owned companies. In the banking industry, this provision is concurrent with the provision of the Commercial Banking Law of 1995, which requires wholly state-owned commercial banks to set up the supervisory board. 9 According to the Commercial Banking Law
and the 1999 Company Law, the State Council, in March 2000, issued the Interim Regulations on Supervisory Board in Major State-Owned Financial Institutions. The Interim
Regulations illustrate in detail various aspects of the supervisory board in wholly stateowned commercial banks and other major state-owned financial institutions.
The supervisory board in wholly state-owned commercial banks is delegated by the State
Council, is responsible to the State Council, and exercises supervision of the quality of
state-owned assets and the matters relating to preserving and increasing the value of stateowned assets on behalf of the state.- As a supervisor, the supervisory board does not participate in or intervene in operation strategies and management of wholly state-owned
41
commercial banks.
Financial supervision is the core function of the supervisory board. In addition to this,
the supervisory board conducts supervision of operational activities and management of the
directors, managers and other major persons in charge, ensuring that the interests of stateowned assets are not violated.42 Putting it concretely, the supervisory board performs the
43
following functions and powers:

35. On a discussion of asset stripping in China's state-owned enterprises, see NICHoLAS R. LARDY,
51-52 (1998).

CHINA'S

UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION

36. 1999 Company Law, art. 71.

37. Id. art. 72.
38. Id. art. 67.
39. Commercial Banking Law, art. 18 (P.R.C.).
40. Interim Regulations on Supervisory Board in Major State-Owned Financial Institutions, art. 3.

41. See id. art. 5.
42. Id. The spirit of this provision is consistent with article 18 of the Commercial Banking Law. Underarticle
18 of the Commercial Banking Law, the supervisory board conducts supervision over loan quality, ratios of assets
and liabilities, maintenance and increase of the value of state-owned assets, and bank's senior management's
violations of laws, regulations, and articles of association and their damages to the interests of the bank.
43. Id. art. 6.
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" Examine wholly state-owned commercial banks' implementation of financial, and economical laws, regulations, and rules;
" Examine wholly state-owned commercial banks' financial affairs, review their financial
and accounting materials and other materials relating to their operations and management, and verify the truthfulness and legality of financial statements and fund operations
reports; and
• Examine operational activities of the board of directors, managers and other major persons in charge, assess their performance and put forth the proposal for rewards, punishments, appointments and removals.
The supervisory board shall conduct regular examinations of wholly state-owned com44
mercial banks twice annually, and may conduct a targeted examination, if necessary. Deor
designate
other
may
attend
pending on the needs, the chairman of the supervisory board
the meetings of
members of the supervisory board to attend, as non-voting participants,
4
the board and other meetings of wholly state-owned commercial banks.
Wholly state-owned commercial banks have a duty to submit their true financial statements and fund operations report to the supervisory board on a regular basis, and to report
major business operations on a timely basis.4
The supervisory board consists of a chairman and several supervisors. 47 The chairman is
appointed by the State Council and must be a civil servant ranked as deputy minister of the
governmental ministry.48 The term of office is three years, and the chairman and full-time
supervisors must not be re-appointed consecutively in the same wholly state-owned commercial bank.49 The chairman and other supervisors should not assume office in the wholly
state-owned commercial banks where they either used to work, or have close relatives in
senior management.50 The governmental financial department will appropriate funds for
the examinations conducted by the supervisory board."' The supervisory board is prohibited
from accepting any gift or reward, and reimbursing any expense from a wholly state-owned
commercial bank.52
3. Legal Weaknesses, InstitutionalDilemmas, and Ambiguity of PropertyRights
The Chinese legal framework has established a basic structure of corporate governance
for wholly state-owned commercial banks: the board of directors (who is also authorized
to exercise part of the functions and powers of the shareholder meeting)," the supervisory
board, management, and employee participation in the board of directors and the supervisory board. The nominal functions and powers bestowed on the different participants in
the corporate governance process are not vastly dissimilar to those found elsewhere. However, legal weaknesses with respect to corporate governance, institutional dilemmas in corporate governance structure, and inherent ambiguity of property rights in wholly state-

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 8.
Interim Regulations on Supervisory Board in Major State-Owned Financial Institutions, art. 13.
Id. art. 15.
Id. art. 16.
Id.
Id. art. 19.
Id. art. 20.
Interim Regulations on Supervisory Board in Major State-Owned Financial Institutions, art. 21.
So far only the Bank of China has set up the board of directors.
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owned commercial banks have significantly prevented wholly state-owned commercial
banks from forming sound corporate governance.
a. Legal Weaknesses
Under the 1999 Company Law, wholly state-owned commercial banks will not set up
the shareholder meeting and the board of directors will be authorized to exercise part
54
of the functions and powers of the shareholding meeting of a limited liability company.
Since the four biggest state-owned commercial banks are subordinated directly to the State
Council, it can be inferred that the State Council will grant authorizations. However, the
1999 Company Law does not clearly stipulate what functions and powers among those of
article 46 of the 1999 Company Law can be authorized to the board of a wholly stateowned commercial bank. Therefore, the possibility exists that different wholly state-owned
commercial banks or the boards of directors of the different periods in the same stateowned commercial bank would obtain different authorizations. This will leave room for
the government to intervene in bank affairs. As a matter of fact, some important decisions
such as mergers, division, dissolution, increase and reduction of capital, and issuance of
company bonds have been left by the law to the state-authorized investment institution or
the department authorized by the State, the State Council in the case of wholly state-owned
commercial banks, rather than banks themselves." As regards the appointment and dismissal of senior management, even if the powers may nominally be authorized to wholly
state-owned commercial banks, the final decision is in the hands of the government. An
example is the reshuffling of senior leadership in the four biggest state-owned commercial
banks. It was reported that it was the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the
56
State Council that decided to adjust senior leaders in the four biggest state-owned banks.
The supervisory board in wholly state-owned commercial banks is different from that in
the German two-tier model. In the two-tier board model, corporations have two separate
boards, a supervisory and a management board. The management board manages the company on a day-to-day basis. Its members are appointed and may be removed by the supervisory board. The supervisory board supervises the activities of the management board but
may not assume any management functions. The management must report regularly to the
supervisory board, and certain transactions may only be concluded by explicit consent of
the supervisory board." By contrast, although the supervisory board in wholly state-owned
commercial banks is a supervisory organ, it is only granted rather loosely defined monitoring powers and functions over the board of directors and management." In particular,
the supervisory board is only allowed to submit a proposal for appointment and removal

54. 1999 Company Law, art. 66. On the functions and powers of the shareholder meeting of the limited
liability company, see supra note 26.
55. 1999 Company Law, art. 66. In addition, merger and division of a commercial bank must obtain the
PBOC's approval under the Commercial Banking Law. See Commercial Banking Law, art. 25.
56. GUANG MING DMLY (GuangmingRi Bao), Feb. 24, 2000, at 1.
57. STEPHEN PROWSE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: A SuRvEY OF CORPORATE
CONTROL MECHANISMS AMONG LARGE FIRMS IN THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, JAPAN AND GEEMANY 42-43 (BIS Economic Papers, No. 41, 1994). The cause for the difference is that the establishment of

the supervisory board is not based on the same social and philosophical considerations as for the setting up of
supervisory boards in the German model of corporate governance. No broader social and historical issues seem
to have been involved in designating the official functions of the supervisory board in China. See ON Krr TA ,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 86 (1999).
58. On the functions and powers of the supervisory board, see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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of directors or management, rather than directly appoint or dismiss directors and management. The lack of such a critical right may lead to a decrease in the monitoring role of the
supervisory board.
Employee participation in the corporate governance process is emphasized by the OECD
Principles of Corporate Governance. 9 The 1999 Company Law of China provides for
employee participation in various respects. According to the 1999 Company Law, wholly
state-owned commercial banks should, through the employee representative meeting and
other forms, conduct democratic management in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution and relevant laws. 60 The employee representatives should participate in the
supervisory board and the board of directors of a wholly state-owned commercial bank.61
However, these employee representatives cannot reasonably be expected to carry out their
role effectively in the supervisory board and the board of directors, since this would be
likely to involve confrontation with their superiors in the bank hierarchy. This is also because the laws and regulations provide no safeguard for employee representatives to perform
their functions. In the 1999 Company Law, there is no provision on the sanctions imposed
on the directors and senior management when they violate the interests of the employee
representatives.
b. Institutional Dilemmas
According to the 1999 Company Law the directors of a wholly state-owned company
are appointed by the state-authorized investment institution or the department authorized
by the State. Since wholly state-owned commercial banks are subordinated to the State
Council the directors at these banks will be appointed by the State Council (so far only the
Bank of China has the board of directors).62 The government-appointed board would create
an institutional dilemma. The government is the owner of the wholly state-owned commercial banks, and therefore has the legal power to appoint the board. As in any other
company, the board should be accountable to the government/owner and act in the best
interest of the government/owner. So when the government's administrative orders take
the form of owner's interests, the board has a duty not only to carry out the orders, but
also to ensure that management would implement effectively the orders. As a result, the
boards of directors in wholly state-owned commercial banks may be facilitators of government intervention.
The supervisory board in a wholly state-owned commercial bank is delegated by the State
Council and is accountable to the State Council. 61 The supervisory board conducts supervision over the directors and management.- The dilemma here is that the supervisory
board, acting in the interests of the government/owner, is required to supervise the directors
and management who act in the interests of the government/owner as well. When the board
and management of a bank implement the administrative orders of the government/owner,

59. OECD PRINCIPLRS, mpra note 7,at 14. Germany and other European countries have formalized significant employee involvement inthe corporate governance of reformed state-owned enterprises. It isoften thought
that greater emphasis is placed on long-term corporate growth and employee reward and welfare rather than
on a preoccupation with the short-term financial performance of the company. See TAM, supra note 57, at 59.
60. 1999 Company Law, art. 16.
61. Id.arts. 67, 68.
62. GUANG MING DAILY, supra note 56, and accompanying text.
63. Interim Regulations on Supervisory Board in Major State-Owned Financial Institutions, art. 3.
64. Id.art. 6(1).
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the supervisory board is unable to put forth any negative opinion about the bank's activity,
because that activity is in line with the interests of the government/owner to which the
supervisory board must pay respect. In this case, the supervisory board either remains indifferent to or enhances the bank's behavior. In addition, the functions and supervisory
methods of the supervisory board overlap those of the PBOC. How to coordinate their
examinations on wholly state-owned commercial banks remains unclear.
In a wholly state-owned commercial bank, there exist three old committees as well as
two new committees (i.e., the board of directors and the supervisory board). The three old
committees are the committee of the communist party, employee representative meeting,
and the worker union. The employee representative meeting and the worker union have
lost their relevance and essentially ceased to function since they came into being. This is
why employee participation in the corporate governance process in a wholly state-owned
commercial bank is only on paper. By contrast, the committee of the communist party has
65
been very influential in bank activity. The experience has shown that the conflicts between
the board/management and the committee of the communist party always pose impediments to sound corporate governance in banks.
c. Ambiguity of Property Rights
One of the main goals of establishing a modern enterprise system in China is to clarify
66
property rights and delineate the roles of the state and of the enterprise. Yet, the state's
undermines
banks
commercial
state-owned
in
wholly
position as a shareholder and owner
the notion of corporate governance. This fundamental problem of corporate governance
arises from the ambiguity of property rights associated with state ownership. Under a system
of ownership by the whole people, the whole people possess property rights and the state
assumes the role of representative of the whole people. On behalf of the whole people, the
state then manages their property by delegating day-to-day operations to companies. However, the whole people are so abstract that the whole people or a particular person has no
real property rights and therefore has no, effective rights to have a say in a company's
governance. By contrast, the central government or its line ministries exercise defacto ownership rights over wholly state-owned commercial banks and other state-owned enterprises.
However, the government, when acting as a shareholder, does not bear any residual risk
6
over the control of wholly state-owned commercial banks. 1 If it did, then conceivably some
and economic growth would override
governmental objectives such as political stability
6s
sound corporate governance and bank efficiency.

65. As a matter of fact, the current presidents of the Agricultural Bank of China and the Construction Bank
of China hold concurrently the position of secretary general the Communist Party Committee of their respective banks.
66. Under the 1999 Company Law, a company shall enjoy the entire property right of the legal person
formed by the investments of the shareholders and shall enjoy civil rights and bear the civil liabilities in
accordance with laws (1999 Company Law, art. 4). The ownership of state-owned assets in a company shall
belong to the State. See id. The above company law also provides that a company shall, with all assets of legal
person, operate independently and be responsible for its own profits and losses according to law. Id. art. 5.
67. In Western corporations, the rights to profits and other benefits accrues to those shareholders who bear
the residual losses of their investments. This allocation of risk gives shareholders a greater incentive to support
economic efficiency. See Joaquin F. Matias, From Work-Units to Corporations: The Role of Chinese Corporate
Governance in a TransitionalMarket Economy, 12 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 1, 47 (1999).
68. In the mid-1990s the response of local political leaders to demonstrations and other actions by workers

who had been furloughed from their jobs in state firms was to require local branches of state banks to extend

SPRING 2002

228

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

On the other hand, the ambiguity of property rights gives rise to the classic principalagent problem. Since the government is only an agent of the ultimate owner-the whole
people-the government, unlike a real owner, lacks initiative to ensure that the sub-agentmanagement-acts in the best interests of the whole people. Except for the case when the
government requires state banks to act in its interests, it may not take effective monitoring
measures on bank management directly (as in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China,
the Agricultural Bank of China, and the Construction Bank of China) or indirectly through
the board of directors (as in the Bank of China). In addition, the absence of shareholders
rebellions, takeovers, and bankruptcy risk removes a crucial check on bank management
performance, leaving management far more discretion. As a result, insider control prevails
in state banks, in particular in the atmosphere of emphasizing the separation of government
from management that underpins the establishment of a modem enterprise system. So the
focus of bank management is not on preserving and increasing the value of state-assets, but
on a policy that justifies paying them and their employees larger salaries, or other strategies
which increase their own benefits but pose a risk to state assets.

m. Monitoring Problem
Apparently, China has set up basic legal and regulatory framework for bank corporate
governance. With the establishment of the board of directors in the Bank of China, the
other three banks (the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Construction Bank
of China, and the Agricultural Bank of China) will set up their boards of directors. Despite
this, however, the most critical problem, monitoring, remains unsolved. That is, in the big
four it is unclear who has economic incentives to assume responsibility to monitoring the
banks to maximize the value of state-owned assets. This leads to a strong call for privatization of the four big banks.
A. PRIVATIZATION: A WORKABLE APPROACH TO SOUND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?

Given that the changes in laws and regulations do not eradicate monitoring problems
inherent in corporate governance, many people have urged the privatization of wholly stateowned commercial banks. The term "privatization," or corporatization, which China prefers to use,69 means restructuring ownership at the four biggest state banks and making

additional credit so that back wages could be paid and urban unrest defused. LARIDY, supra note 35, at 128-29.
During the years of 1999 and 2000, the central government had attempted to make use of state commercial
banks to support state-owned enterprise reform. At the National People's Congress in March 1999, state banks
were reminded of their "political responsibility" to lend to money-losing enterprises. InJune 1998 the PBOC
advised state commercial banks to increase their financial support of ailing state-owned enterprises and to boost
economic growth. It has been reported that state commercial banks have increased their backing of local
economic development in different localities. SeeRichard Wong, Competition in China's Banking Industry
(Part 11), 3 Oct. 2000, available at http-J/www.chinaonline.com/commentary ... treforn/currentews/secure/
c0092960.asp.
69. The terms of privatization and corporatization reflect the difference in ideology. Corporatization, which
is the conversion of a state-owned enterprise into a shareholding company is regarded as ideologically compatible with "socialism with Chinese characteristics" while privatization, stemming from the word "private,"
is identified with the institution of private ownership without necessarily ensuring the preservation of the state
as the agent of the whole people. See Lan Cao, Chinese Privatization:Between Plan and Market, 63 LAw. &
CowrEMP. PROs. 13, 14 (2000).
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them shareholding companies with listings on domestic or overseas stock markets."° The
basic consideration is that under a shareholding system there are several sanctions and
incentives being used to induce bank management to maximise the value of shareholders'
investment. Since investors can withdraw their assets by selling stock (vote with their feet),
the market for shares gives owners a means of pressure, while the absence of a share market
would remove such a sanction for bad management performance. The threat of bankruptcy
and takeovers, which lead to manager dismissals, may also discipline managers.
It was reported that the Big Four are planning to list within next three to five years.7" It
seems that restructuring state banks into shareholding banks can solve the structural problems in corporate governance." However, even if the Big Four state-owned banks can be
privatized, they will remain with the government holding the majority share. The Governor
of the PBOC, Dai Xianglong, claims that wholly state-owned commercial banks which
meet the requirements may be restructured to be joint stock banks with the state retaining
a controlling share; and when conditions are ripe, those joint stock banks can be listed."
Under a bank with the government holding a majority share, however, corporate governance cannot be expected to be improved critically, although those banks, as joint stock
companies or probably listed companies, have to comply with statutory requirements on
protecting minority shareholders and have greater transparency, which represents an improvement over the governance of banks. As in wholly state-owned commercial banks, the
government will still have the power to appoint the board of directors. The government's
will will continue to be carried out by its appointed board and the board appointed management. The supervisory board will continue to be confronted with the problem of conflict
of interests as they are authorized by the government to supervise the government appointed board and management. Ambiguous property rights will not become more clearcut with the emergence of joint stock banks because in such banks real owners of property
will continue to be unable to exercise their ownership rights and the government will continue to exercise defacto ownership rights without bearing any residual risks.
As a matter of fact, even in typical joint stock companies, there is a chronic principalagent problem arising from the separation of ownership and management. Market systems
provide three corrective mechanisms to mitigate the problem. 4 One method is to induce

70. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the government's top think-tank, called for listing part of the
state banks' shares on the domestic stock markets, placing shares with non-state Chinese firms or selling some
stakes to foreign investors. China: China's WTO Deal Heralds Radical Banking Refom, REUTERs ENG. NEws
SERv., Nov. 16, 1999, at http://web2.westlaw.com/shared/search.
71. R. J. Michaels, Bullish over Big Four: Experts
Favor Top Banks' Plans toList, Oct. 17, 2000, available at
http'J/www.chinaonline.com/topstories/00101 7/l/cOO01 10175 L.asp.
72. For example, Fang Xinghai, general manager of the Construction Bank of China's group coordination
committee, said: "I see no better way than listing the banks on the stock market to improve the bank's corporate
governance". See Reuters, China: China'sBig Four Banks Eye Stock Listings, RasmEas ENG. NEws SERv., Apr. 23,
2000, at http://web2.westlaw.com/shared/search. Cf.The last ten years have witnessed a massive surge in the
size and number of firms being sold to private investors by governments around the world. The cumulative
value of privatizations passed $1 trillion during 1999. Almost all published empirical research has strongly
suggested that privatization is associated with significant performance improvements in enterprises. William
L. Megginson, Corporate Governance in Publicly-Quoted Companies, Paper on the OECD Conference on
Corporate Governance of SOEs in China, at 15, 17 (Beijing, Jan. 18-19, 2000).
73. Dai Xianglong, Do Our Best at All Types of the Central Banking Activities in an All-Round Way wsith an
Emphasis ofFinancialRegulation, CHINA FINANCE 4, 6 (in Chinese, iss. 2, 2001).
74. Maher & Andersson, supra note 19, at 7.
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managers to carry out efficient management by directly aligning managers' interests with
those of shareholders, e.g., management compensation and direct monitoring by boards.
The second solution involves the strengthening of shareholder's rights so shareholders have
both a greater incentive and ability to monitor management. This approach enhances the
rights of investors through legal protection from expropriation by managers, e.g., protection and enforcement of shareholder rights, and prohibitions against insider-dealings. The
third approach is to use indirect means such as takeovers. The takeover market is widely
recognized as a potentially important mechanism by which capital markets ensure management discipline.7"
The above three approaches, however, might not be workable. The role that management
compensation currently plays as a mechanism of corporate control may be overemphasized. 6 There is a possibility that the initiatives of managers to maximize shareholder value
would be reduced if managers can benefit more from rent-seeking behaviors than from
management compensation. In addition, the board of directors often performs its monitoring function either passively or ineffectively." In regards to the second approach above,
corporate laws and relevant regulations already have clear stipulations on these issues. Apparently, the reason why the approach may not be workable is ineffective implementation
of these laws and regulations. Implementation of law is forever a sticky problem. For takeovers, there are a number of impediments for them to be an effective mechanism of corporate control."8 The first is the free-rider problem in making a successful tender offer for
a firm."9 The second impediment is the inability to keep tender offers secret, which implies
that the original bidder who expends resources to identify the target will have a negative
expected profit and will therefore have little incentive to undertake such research in the
first place. 0 The final impediment is that current managers are often well placed to take
strategic action to deter takeover." In particular, under a rather concentrated ownership
75. PaowsE, supra note 57, at 46.
76. See id. at 45.
77. See Benjamin T. Lo, Improving Corporate Governance: Lessons from the European Community, 1 IND. J.

219, 223-24 (1993). The reasons are that first, board members are often nominated by
chief executives to serve on corporate boards; second, directors usually do not have adequate time to carry out
their assigned duties; third, directors may be poorly informed about corporate matters; fourth, boards are
unable to work as a cohesive group for the corporation; and finally the chief executive officer also often assumes
the role of the chairman of the board of directors.
78. See PRowsa, supra note 57, at 63-64.
79. Shareholders in a company subject to a hostile takeover bid have an incentive not to accept the bid and
will hope that others will sell out. Should the bid succeed the resistant shareholder can reap the full value of
the equity arising from the reorganization of the company, which may exceed the value of the bid. The shareholder will fee-ride on the eventual returns to the bidder. If all shareholders behaved in this way a bid would
fail. For an overview of the free-rider problem, see Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bidr, the FreeRider Problem,and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELLJ. ECON. 42 (1980).
GLOBAL. LEGAL STUD.

Free-rider problem is a common phenomenon in corporate governance. Monitoring and good management
are public goods in the sense that all shareholders benefit from them and that those who monitor may not

obtain all gains from monitoring. Furthermore, while a single shareholder bears the full costs of his monitoring
activities, he receives only a pro rata share of the benefits. As a result, he prefers to rely on other shareholders'
monitoring and good management and reaps the return from these public goods. See David Eu, Financial
Rgorms and Corporate Governance in China, 34 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 469, 475-76 (1996). But Black argues
that shareholder passivity and free-rider problem might be overstated. See cf. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching
Agents: Tbe Promiseof InstiutionalInvestor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rav. 811, 822 (1992).
80. See PaowsE, supra note 57, at 63-64.
81. See id. at 64.
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structure, a bidder would find it difficult to attain a sufficiently large stake in a company to
take it over without the consent of the largest shareholders, the government in a Chinese
joint stock bank, for instance. In China, government approval for takeover may pose an
additional impediment to successful takeover.8s
B.

ALTERNATi E APPROACH: THE IDEA OF AN INVESTMENT COMPANY FOR STATE-OWNED
ASSETS IN STATE-OWNED COMMERCIL* BANKs

In the absence of well-developed and efficient capital markets, privatization of China's
wholly state-owned commercial banks is not a workable approach to improving corporate
governance in these banks. As a matter of fact, in China the problem with corporate governance is not whether to privatize state-owned commercial banks, but who will assume
responsibility for monitoring, i.e., maintaining and increasing the value of state assets in
those banks. As discussed above, the government is not eligible for this monitoring role,
and therefore privatization with the state holding a controlling share will not work either.
Monitoring patterns can roughly be classified into three types: German bank-centered
monitoring, Japanese exchange-centered monitoring and American investor-centered
monitoring. s3 Due to its fragmented financial system, the American pattern was blamed for
fragmented corporate ownership and shareholder passivity. 4 In contrast, German and Japanese patterns are regarded as better models of monitoring because of concentrated ownership in portfolio companies. As a result, proposals for creating institutional monitoring
have been put forth.
From this perspective, the existence of concentrated holdings by the government in
China's state-owned commercial banks may constitute an important way to overcome the
perennial problem of principal and agent in corporate governance. It has been argued that
ownership concentration can overcome the problems with the monitoring of management
that are associated with dispersed ownership. This is because if the equity of the firm is
concentrated in the hands of a few investors, each investor will have sufficient private incentive to invest in information acquisition and monitoring of management; 5 and they are
less able to sell their shares and take the "Wall Street walk."8 6 In addition, large shareholdings also give them the ability to exert control over management either through their voting
rights or through representation on the board of directors, or both.8
As a matter of fact, the Chinese government has paid attention to the role of the dominance of the state as equity holder in corporate governance. For general joint stock limited
companies and limited liability companies, the state-authorized investment institutions or
the departments authorized by the state hold state-owed shares exercise the rights of the

82. Under the 1999 Company Law, the merge or division of a joint stock limited company must be approved
by the government departments. 1999 CoMPANY LAw, art. 183. For a bank, its merger or division must be
approved by the PBOC. COMMERCtAL B ANING LAW, art. 69.
83. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as GuardianShareholders: The Place of
the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REv. 985, 987-990 (1993).
84. See generally Mark Roe, A PoliticalTheory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. Rov. 10 (1991);
Bernard S. Black, ShareholderPassivityReexamined, 89 MICn. L. REv. 520 (1990); see also Black, supra note 79.
85. See PRowsa, supra note 57, at 11.
86. John H. Matheson, Corporate Governance at the Millennium: The Decline of the Poison Pill Antitakeover
Defense, 22 HAMLmnE L. Rav. 703, 735 (1999).
87. See PROWSE, supra note 57, at 11-12.
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state shareholder on behalf of the government.ss These institutions or departments include
holding companies, investment companies, parent companies of enterprise groups, and the
Bureau of State Property Management when the state-authorized investment institutions
are not clarified. 9 These institutions and departments enjoy the same rights as other general
shareholders.90 However, this practice has been criticized as unsuccessful. 9 At least we can
say that corporate governance of China's companies has not benefited from the advantages
associated with the concentration of state ownership in companies. The main reason is that
most of the state-authorized institutions were directly restructured from government departments and have not become true modern companies. The management of these institutions is in fact composed of civil servants. Governmental bureaucratism still inherently
exists. In addition, there are confficts of interest between the Bureau of State Property
Management (BSPM), as a special administrative agency for state-owned shares, the stateauthorized investment institutions, and companies. 9
Apparently, the idea of the state-authorized investment institution or the department
authorized by the state as shareholders may not be helpful to improving corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks. To make full use of the advantages arising from
concentrated ownership, China should establish special, professional, and commercialbased Investment Companies for state-owned assets in wholly state-owned commercial
banks (Special Bank Investment Companies). The government should delegate state-owned
assets in the Big Four banks to these Special Bank Investment Companies. Under this
structure, the government is no longer the shareholder of the Big Four banks. The banks
do not have any relationship with the government.
The Special Bank Investment Company would be a privatized company, whether joint
stock limited company or limited liability company, with clear corporate objectives, strong
economic incentives, and delineated lines of responsibility. For the purposes of diversifying
88. See Bureau of State Property Management and State Commission for the Reform of the Economic
System, Interim Regulations on the Administration of State-Owned Shares in Joint Stock Limited Companies,
arts. 2, 16 (Nov. 1994); Bureau of State Property Management and State Commission for the Reform of the
Economic System, Opinions on the Formalization of the Exercising of the Rights of State-Owned Shares in
Joint Stock Limited Companies, art. 2 (Mar. 1997); and 1999 Company Law, arts. 20, 21, 64.
89. Interim Regulations on the Administration of State-Owned Shares in Joint Stock Limited Companies,
art. 16.
90. These institutions and departments have the following shareholder rights: (1) to delegate a shareholder's
representative to attend the general shareholders' meeting and exercise his/her voting right; (2) to participate
in company elections and be elected; (3) to increase purchase, receive, donate, transfer, or mortgage shareholding according to the rules; (4) to inspect company articles of association, minutes of general shareholders'
meeting, and financial and accounting reports of the company; and to monitor the management of production,
business and finance of the company, and make suggestions and inquires; (5) to obtain dividend and other
distributed benefits according to the proportion of shareholding; and (6) to take legal action against any illegal
and harmful behavior of the company. See Opinions on the Formalization of the Exercising of the Rights of
State-Owned Shares in Joint Stock Limited Companies, art. 6.
91. Some authors have asserted that the higher ratio of the state-owned shares, the worse the situation of
corporate governance. See Junju Ma & Decong Nie, Recent Development of CarporateGovernance Structure, 22
LAw STUDIEs 81, 87 (in Chinese, iss. 2, 2000). Xiaonian Xu & Yan Wang, Ownership Structure, Corporate
Governance, and Firms' Performance: The Case of Chinese Stock Companies, at 23 (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author, May 1997) (stating that the state as a large shareholder has negative or insignificant effects
on a finns' value).
92. For example, when a company needs to raise new capital through rights offerings, the BSPM will force
the state-authorized institution or through its representatives on the board to vote against it as the offerings
will likely dilute state shares. See Xu & Wang, supra note 91, at 24.
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risk and enhancing competition, a separate Special Bank Investment Company would be
set up for each wholly state-owned commercial bank. The Special Bank Investment Companies are long-term investors in these banks. Their main business activity would be to
monitor management by the Big Four state-owned assets. Their main income would be the
dividends associated with the investments in the banks, shared with the government. Therefore, their own economic interests would be closely interrelated with the performance of
the banks, which would provide strong incentives to actively monitor the banks.
The Special Bank Investment Company would specialize in asset management with possession of time, expertise and monitoring skills. As the sole shareholder of a wholly stateowned commercial bank, the Special Bank Investment Company would enjoy shareholder's
rights stipulated in the company law. It would delegate day-to-day monitoring to the supervisory board (the German two-tier board model should be adopted in state-owned commercial banks, see below). It could hire executive directors and non-executive directors to
undertake bank-specific monitoring on its behalf. It could also place its own representatives
on the supervisory board. The representatives are likely to be more accountable to the
Special Bank Investment Company that appoints them, and less to bank management.
Furthermore, in a state-owned commercial bank, the German two-tier board model
should be adopted to create a clear institutional and personal separation of monitoring and
management organs. The supervisory board will appoint managing directors and exercise
day-to-day monitoring activities on behalf of the Special Bank Investment Company. Managing directors will be unable to influence or dominate the supervisory board meetings as
they cannot be present or represented on the supervisory board. Thus, the supervisory
board will act independent of the managing board and lead to effective monitoring of the
bank.93
The Special Bank Investment Company would owe fiduciary duties to the government
concerning state-owned assets in a wholly state-owned commercial bank. These duties include duty of care, duty of loyalty, and duty of good faith.- Related to the issue is who will
monitor the monitor. The issue in the case of Special Bank Investment Company is less
serious that in other cases. Due to the specifics of the business of the Special Bank Investment Company, i.e., monitoring bank management of state-owned assets, the duties owed
to the government and benefits produced to the company are interrelated. Its indolence in
monitoring, thereby resulting in bad performance of a bank, would directly affect its economic income. In addition, the government will have the power to withdraw its assets from
a problem Special Bank Investment Company and delegate them to other Special Bank
Investment Companies. Therefore, the Special Bank Investment Company will have limited
incentives to breach fiduciary duties because it loses more if it is "caught" than it gains if
it succeeds. 91
The idea of the Special Bank Investment Company would overcome some most common
problems faced by institutional investors, such as institutional passivity,96 conflicts of inter93. See Lo,supra note 77, at 241.
94. SeeJulian Javier Garza, Rethinking Corporate Governance:The Rok ofMinority Sbareholderr-AComparative

Study, 31 ST. MARY's LJ.613, 628-34 (2000).

95. Fiduciary liability is a strong constraint on institutional investors. See f.Black, supranote 79, at 856.
96. If an institutional investor collects a large amount of one company's stock, the investor will no longer
be sufficiently diversified. Unable to manage risk effectively, it will become less attractive to customers seeking
to use it to mange risk. As a result, an institutional investor isunlikely to adopt the strong ownership role.
Instead, the institution will remain largely passive investors. See Thomas A.Smith, InstitutionsandEntrepreneury
in American CorporateFinance, 85 CAL. L. Ray. 1,5 Uan. 1997).
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est,97 and free riding.9s The primary task of a Special Bank Investment Company would be
to monitor bank management. Actively devoting itself to monitoring would be its job. So
for a Special Bank Investment Company institutional passivity does not exit. As a matter of
fact the Special Bank Investment Company is truly monitoring activism. As the sole shareholder of a wholly state-owned commercial bank, only the Special Bank Investment Company and the government as the former beneficiary, would benefit from its successful monitoring. No other institutions would share the gains arising from its successful intervention.
Therefore there is no "free riding" prevalence. What distinguishes a Special Bank Investment Company from institutional investors is that the former is a pure equity investor and
its sole interest is in investment returns. The company does not have any business relationships with the portfolio banks. Thus, Special Bank Investment Companies would not
give rise to conflicts of interest that would accompany active investments by commercial
banks, pension funds, mutual funds, or insurance companies.
IV. Concluding Remarks
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the BIS Banking Corporate Governance focus on publicly traded companies and banks. However, their general principles
are also useful tools to improve corporate governance in non-traded banks. They imply
that there is no single form of corporate governance model that has emerged as dominant.9
Privatization may not be the sole way to solve the problem of corporate governance in
China's state-owned banks. In other words, even in the absence of privatization, it is still
possible to run the public sector efficiently if there is clarity of corporate objectives, clear
lines of responsibility, independent agencies for monitoring, strong financial incentives, and
competitive pressures. As we discussed above, the important consideration is that banks are
in some way accountable to and monitored by their owners. The current reality is that
China has decided that neither the government nor the people, the theoretical owner of
the state-assets in state-owned banks, is qualified for this monitoring role.
The absolute dominance of the state in wholly state-owned commercial banks indicates
that China could start from a stage of corporate development in terms of ownership composition that has taken the West many decades to develop."00 Concentrated ownership in
the four biggest banks does not require a solution to weak corporate governance in these

97. Many institutional investors face conflicts of interest. For example, money mangers that vote against a
company's proposals are likely to lose any business that they conduct with the company. Money mangers that
develop an anti-manager reputation may lose corporate business, or find it harder to gain new business. These
conflicts lead some institutions to vote pro-manager even when doing so is likely to decrease company value.
See Black, supra note 79, at 826. See also MarkJ. Roe, PoliticalElements in the Creationof a Mutual FundIndurmy,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 1469, 1503-04 (1991).

98. Although an institutional investor that undertakes successful shareholder interventions may attract new
clients, other fund managers also benefit from the successful intervention. See Bernard S. Black & John C.
Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?:Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MIcH. L. Rav. 1997,
2057 (1994). See also Monika Queisser, The Role of Pension Funds in the Stabilization of the Domestic Financial

Sector,in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM: STANDARD SETrING AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 5 (stating that any gains a pension fund might reap from a more active participation in company
management must be shared with the other investors in the company, including institutional investors competing with the pension or mutual fund mangers).
99. NoRToN, supra note 1, at 225.
100. See TAM, supra note 57, at 49.

VOL. 36, NO. 1

CHINA'S STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS

235

banks through privatization. However, due to the existence of ambiguous property rights,
the government may lack incentives to monitor banks on fully commercial principles. Moreover, such monitoring often turns into governmental intervention. For these reasons, improving corporate governance in China's state-owned commercial banks is not to dilute
ownership in these banks, but to find an agency that has strong financial incentives to
monitor banks on behalf of the state. This is one of the main reasons that we introduce the
concept of the Special Bank Investment Company, which is a purely commercial entity.
A more significant problem with corporate governance, in our opinion, is that banks have
established wrong performance accountability.°1 In other words, they do not know for what
they should be held accountable. The long-practiced methods of applying administrative
means to economic activities have formulated such a value that the relation between banks
and governments is that of inferiority and superiority. As a result, banks are accountable to
governments for obeying their orders and regard satisfactorily fulfilling the governments'
tasks as a duty (sometimes the governments' tasks would be called as political tasks). The
performance in this regard has much to do with the promotion of bank officials, in particular
when the governments at various levels maintain authority over bank personnel within their
localities. So it is understandable that banks may focus on how to satisfy the governments
rather than on how to increase the value of state-owned assets at banks.
Therefore, what corporate governance reforms in China's state-owned banks are facing
is not only to identify to whom those banks are accountable, but also to clarify for what
they are accountable. The establishment of Special Bank Investment Company cuts off the
connection between the government and the banks, and holds banks accountable to the
Special Bank Investment Companies. As these Special Bank Investment Companies are
purely commercial entities, they have proper incentives to require the banks to act in their
interests. It appears that the Special Bank Investment Company may be an effective approach to improving corporate governance of China's state-owned commercial banks.
However, the barrier to the establishment of Special Bank Investment Company is whether
the government can delegate state-owned assets to these companies.

101. "Performance accountability" is borrowed from Dr. Lastra when she discusses the issue of central bank
accountability. Performance is generally measured with relation to the statutory goal(s) to be achieved. The
governing bodies of the central bank, particularly the governor should be held accountable for failing to achieve
such objectives. SeeRoSA M. LAs'rA, CENTRAL BANKIc AND BANKIN REGuLA-nON 51 (1996).
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